Abstract
Introduction
The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) was created in 1993 to try ' Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the former Yugoslavia since 1991 ' . It has indicted 161 such persons and concluded proceedings against 117 accused. While the majority of these pleaded not guilty, 20 defendants have pleaded guilty. Such guilty pleas have generally been accepted by the Trial Chambers as mitigating circumstances on the grounds, inter alia , that they can facilitate reconciliation in the former Yugoslavia. Yet as these guilty pleas are frequently induced through plea bargains, in which important concessions are accorded to defendants, this necessarily raises fundamental questions about whether guilty pleas can and do in fact foster reconciliation. The purpose of this article, therefore, is to explore this posited link between guilty pleas and reconciliation which, in turn, is one dimension of the broader linkage that the Tribunal makes between its work and reconciliation.
1
The article will begin with a general overview of plea agreements. It will argue that the increased usage of plea bargains, 2 and in particular their reputed practical benefi ts, should be understood in the context of the Tribunal's completion strategy and the pressure it faces from the UN to complete its work by 2011. heavily upon key ICTY judgments, section 2 will examine the Tribunal's claim that guilty pleas aid reconciliation by helping to establish the truth. It will suggest that this argument is problematic because, due to plea bargaining, and more specifically charge bargaining, the ' truth ' that is established through guilty pleas will often be only an incomplete truth. The fi nal section will address the Tribunal's contention that guilty pleas facilitate reconciliation on the basis that when defendants acknowledge responsibility for their crimes, this may help to provide victims with closure. Challenging this claim, it will argue that the reconciling potential of such acknowledgements is seriously undermined when defendants receive reduced prison sentences. It will conclude by identifying and discussing some of the broader issues and questions raised by the ICTY's use of plea bargains, in particular emphasizing the critical relationship between plea bargains and outreach work.
Background
The ICTY Statute does not explicitly address the issue of guilty pleas. Article 20(3) simply states, ' The Trial Chamber shall read the indictment, satisfy itself that the rights of the accused are respected, confi rm that the accused understands the indictment and instruct the accused to enter a plea. The Trial Chamber shall then set the date for trial. ' Dra ž en Erdemovi ć , a soldier in the 10th Sabotage Detachment of the Bosnian Serb Army operating in the region of Zvornik, in north-eastern Bosnia, was the fi rst defendant to plead guilty at the ICTY, on 31 May 1996. Subsequently, during the Fourteenth Plenary Session of 20 October and 12 November 1997, the ICTY adopted Rule 62 bis . This declares that:
If an accused pleads guilty in accordance with Rule 62 (vi) or requests to change his or her plea to guilty and the Trial Chamber is satisfi ed that (i) the guilty plea has been made voluntarily, (ii) the guilty plea is informed, (iii) the guilty plea is not equivocal and (iv) there is a suffi cient factual basis for the crime and for the accused's participation in it, either on the basis of independent indicia or in lack of any material disagreement between the parties about the facts of the case, the Trial Chamber may enter a fi nding of guilt and instruct the Registrar to set a date for the sentencing hearing.
While Erdemovi ć had pleaded guilty to murder (a crime against humanity), this was not the result of a plea agreement. The defendant had confessed to his involvement in the massacre of 1,200 Muslim men at a collective farm near Pilica, in the Zvornik municipality, ' at a time when no authority was seeking to prosecute him in connection therewith, knowing that he would most probably face prosecution as a result ' , 4 and his guilty plea was not induced through the granting of concessions. 5 Indeed, the ICTY's fi rst 4 Prosecutor v. Dra ž en Erdemovi ć , Case No. IT-96-22-T bis , Second Sentencing Judgment (5 Mar. 1998) , at para. 21.
5
The Trial Chamber did decide, however, that for the remainder of the proceedings it would dismiss the second count against the defendant -namely violations of the laws or customs of war -which had been charged as an alternative to the fi rst count of a crime against humanity. The Appeals Chamber subsequently found that Erdemovi ć ' s guilty plea was not informed, and accordingly remitted the case to a new Trial Chamber. In his second trial, Erdemovi ć once again pleaded guilty, but this time to murder as a violation of the laws or customs of war. The Prosecutor withdrew the alternative count of a crime against humanity, which followed a plea agreement entered into between the parties on 8 Jan. 1998. President, Antonio Cassese, maintained that plea agreements were not permitted in the Tribunal's proceedings. 6 However, after a number of defendants following Erdemovi ć also pleaded guilty, 7 Rule 62 ter was adopted on 13 December 2001. This states:
(A) The Prosecutor and the Defence may agree that, upon the accused entering a plea of guilty to the indictment or to one or more counts of the indictment, the Prosecutor shall do one or more of the following before the Trial Chamber: (i) apply to amend the indictment accordingly; (ii) submit that a specifi c sentence or sentencing range is appropriate; (iii) not oppose a request by the accused for a particular sentence or sentencing range.
(B) The Trial Chamber shall not be bound by any agreement specifi ed in paragraph A.
Thus, in its sentencing judgment in the trial of Momir Nikoli ć , the former assistant commander and chief of security and intelligence of the Bratunac Brigade of the Bosnian Serb army, the Trial Chamber declared that it had ' no doubt that plea agreements are permissible under the 6 In a statement on 11 February 1994, Cassese rejected the possibility of allowing plea bargains. In his words, ' we always have to keep in mind that this tribunal is not a municipal criminal court but one that is charged with trying persons accused of the gravest possible of all crimes. The persons appearing before us will be charged with genocide, torture, murder, sexual assault, wanton destruction, persecution and other inhumane acts. After due refl ection, we have decided that no one should be immune from prosecution for crimes such as these, no matter how useful their testimony may otherwise be ' : cited in V. Morris and M.P. Scharf, An Insider's Guide to the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (1995) , ii, at 649, 652.
Statute and Rules of the Tribunal ' .
8 What is more, plea agreements -that is to say ' bargaining through which a defendant agrees to plead guilty in exchange for sentencing or charging reductions ' 9 -have now become an increasingly important part of the ICTY's proceedings, not least for practical reasons.
By entering a guilty plea, a defendant waives certain procedural rights, including the right to plead not guilty, the right to require the Prosecution to prove the charges made against him at a fair and public trial, and the right to put forward a defence to those charges at such a public trial. Admissions of guilt, which have been accepted by the ICTY as mitigating circumstances 10 even when they occur late in the proceedings, 11 thereby save the Tribunal a considerable amount of valuable time and resources. Hence, the judges have strongly emphasized the practical advantages of While there is nothing in the Tribunal's Rules of Procedure and Evidence on what count as mitigating factors, with the exception of substantial co-operation with the Prosecution, a clear jurisprudence has developed on this issue. Some of the mitigating factors recognized by the ICTY include expressions of remorse (Plav š i ć , Erdemovi ć , Bla š ki ć , Simi ć , Bralo), voluntary surrender (Simi ć , Bralo, Plav š i ć ), age (Erdemovi ć ), family circumstances (Babi ć , Bralo), duress (Erdemovi ć ), prior good character (Momir Nikoli ć ), and post-confl ict conduct (Plav š i ć ).
11
In its sentencing of the former chief of police in Bosanski Š amac, Stevan Todorovi ć , who entered his guilty plea 26 months after his initial appearance at the ICTY, the Trial Chamber found that, ' if pleaded at a later stage of the proceedings, or even after the conclusion of the trial, a voluntary admission of guilt will not save the International Tribunal the time and effort of a lengthy trial ' : Prosecutor v. Stevan Todorovi ć , Case No. IT-95-guilty pleas.
12 As Judges McDonald and Vohrah argued in their dissenting judgment in Erdemovi ć ' s appeal, guilty pleas should:
fi nd a ready place in an international criminal forum such as the International 9/1-S, Sentencing Judgment (31 July 2001), at para. 81. However, in its judgment sentencing Du š ko Sikirica and Damir Do š en, who had worked at the Keraterm detention camp in northwestern Bosnia as a commander of security and shift leader respectively, the Trial Chamber found that notwithstanding the tardiness of the defendants ' guilty pleas, they should nevertheless receive some credit for them. It further found that a third defendant, Dragan Kolund ž ija, a former shift commander at the Keraterm camp who entered a guilty plea before the commencement of his case, ' should receive close to full credit for his guilty plea ' : Prosecutor v. Du š ko Sikirica, Damir Do š en and Dragan Kolund ž ija , Case No. IT-95-8-S, Sentencing Judgment (13 Nov. 2001), at paras. 151, 193, and 228 . In order to avoid inconsistencies, Beresford suggests that ' [t] he Chambers should consider applying a graduated system whereby an accused who indicated during the initial appearance that he wished to plead guilty receives a greater discount than one who pleaded guilty on the date set for the trial, having previously indicated his intention to fi ght the case ' : Beresford, ' Unshackling the Paper Tiger -The Sentencing Practices of the Ad Hoc International Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda ' , 1 Int'l Criminal L Rev (2001) 65. 12 In its sentencing judgment in the trial of Momir Nikoli ć , the Trial Chamber took ' note of the fact that other accused have been given credit for pleading guilty before the start of a trial or at an early stage of the trial because of the savings of Tribunal resources ' : Prosecutor v. Momir Nikoli ć , supra note 8, at para. 151. However, while appreciating the saving of Tribunal resources, the judges also emphasized that ' [t] he quality of justice and the fulfi lment of the mandate of the Tribunal, including the establishment of a complete and accurate record of the crimes committed in the former Yugoslavia, must not be compromised … Thus, while saving of time and resources may be the result of guilty pleas, this consideration should not be the main reason for promoting guilty pleas through plea agreements ' : supra note 8, at para. 67.
Tribunal confronted by cases which, by their inherent nature, are very complex and necessarily require lengthy hearings if they go to trial under stringent fi nancial constraints arising from allocations made by the United Nations, itself dependent upon the contributions of the United States.
13
According to Jørgensen, therefore, ' it may be stated tentatively that the guilty plea has come of age, which represents a triumph for pragmatism ' .
14 The practical benefi ts of guilty pleas, moreover, are especially apparent in the context of the Tribunal's completion strategy. 21 ' however one views the desirability of such concessions in the domestic context, they appear particularly unseemly in the international criminal context given the gravity of the crimes being prosecuted ' . 22 Indeed, in its sentencing judgment in the trial of Momir Nikoli ć , the Trial Chamber itself observed that ' [e]ven in criminal justice systems where the use of plea agreements is common … its use is less frequent in cases of serious felonies or in the most notorious cases ' . 23 In view of the gravity of the crimes with which the ICTY is dealing -namely crimes against humanity, violations of the laws or customs of war, grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions, and genocidethere must, therefore, be other justifi cations for guilty pleas and plea bargains beyond practical considerations. Thus, the judges have also repeatedly stressed, inter alia , that guilty pleas spare witnesses from having to travel to The Hague to give evidence, 24 and that they are important for 20 For example, ' [t]he average sentence for an accused having pled guilty before the ICTY is approximately 11 years of imprisonment, whereas the average for cases that go to trial is approximately 17 years of imprisonment ' : Dixon and Demirdjian, supra note 18, at 681.
21
Combs notes that ' approximately 90% of all American criminal cases are disposed of by a guilty plea secured through plea bargaining … Such high guilty plea rates are commonly believed necessary in order for the system to function ' : Combs, supra note 9, at 19.
22
Ibid., at 7.
23
Prosecutor v. Momir Nikoli ć , supra note 8, at para. 47.
24
In the trial of Todorovi ć , e.g., the Trial Chamber highlighted ' the important factor that by pleading guilty, an accused relieves victims and witnesses of the necessity of giving evidence with helping to establish the truth. 25 Linked to the latter claim, they have also frequently made the argument that guilty pleas aid reconciliation, thus furthering one of the Tribunal's three offi cial goals, namely the restoration and maintenance of peace in the former Yugoslavia. 26 This contention that guilty pleas facilitate reconciliation should be viewed in the context of a broader debate in the transitional justice literature regarding the relationship between retributive justice and peace/reconciliation. For supporters of international war crimes tribunals, there is a positive link between criminal trials and reconciliation. Moghalu, for example, maintains that the attendant stress which this may incur ' : Prosecutor v. Stevan Todorovi ć , supra note 11, at para. 80. Similarly, in its judgment sentencing Miroslav Bralo, the judges found that ' [s]ubstantial human and practical benefi ts fl ow from a guilty plea, particularly one tendered at an early stage in the proceedings. Victims and witnesses who have already suffered enormous psychological and practical harm are not required to travel to The Hague to recount their experiences in court, and potentially re-live their trauma ' : Prosecutor v. Miroslav Bralo , Case No. IT-95-17-S, Sentencing Judgment (7 Dec. 2005), at para. 22.
25
In its sentencing of Todorovi ć , the Trial Chamber stressed that a guilty plea ' is always important for the purpose of establishing the truth in relation to that crime ' : supra note 11, at para. 81. Similarly, in the trial of Miroslav Deronji ć , the former president of the crisis staff in the municipality of Bratunac it was pointed out that, ' in contrast to national legal systems where the reasons for mitigating a punishment on the basis of a guilty plea are of a more pragmatic nature, the rationale behind the mitigating effect of a guilty plea in this Tribunal is much broader, including the fact that the accused contributes to establishing the truth about the confl ict in the former Yugoslavia and contributes to reconciliation in the affected communities ' : Prosecutor v. Miroslav Deronji ć , Case No. IT-02-61-S, Sentencing Judgment (30 Mar. 2004) , at para. 236.
26
The Tribunal's other goals are to deliver justice and to deter further crimes. ' [w]hen justice is done, and seen to be done, it provides a catharsis for those physically or psychologically scarred by violations of international humanitarian law. Deepseated resentments -key obstacles to reconciliation -are removed and people on different sides of the divide can feel that a clean slate has been provided for ' . 27 Many of the discussions on this topic, however, are merely theoretical and not empirically grounded. Indeed, this is an area in which there is a signifi cant lack of empirical research.
28 Nevertheless, the ICTY has frequently made a positive link between the work that it is doing and reconciliation in the former Yugoslavia.
29 Graham Blewitt, for example, the Tribunal's former deputy Prosecutor, maintains that ' [t]he ICTY was established, in part, as a measure for the maintenance of international peace and security, through its ability to contribute to reconciliation in the territorial in The Hague in the Netherlands, not in the former Yugoslavia; its working languages are English and French, not Bosnian/Croatian/Serbian; and while it uses a mixture of the adversarial common law system and the inquisitorial civil law system, it leans towards the former, a system with which people in the former Yugoslavia -where the civil law system is applied -are unfamiliar. 34 Hence, if the Tribunal is to aid reconciliation in the former Yugoslavia, it is essential that people in the region are well informed about it and understand its proceedings and judgments. To cite the former ICTY deputy Prosecutor Graham Blewitt, ' It is important that the elaborate factual discussions and fi ndings in ICTY judgements be properly received in the republics of the former Yugoslavia, so that their reconciliatory potential is appropriately made use of in those war-torn societies, especially for the benefi t of their emerging generations of citizens. '
35
From the outset, therefore, the ICTY needed to reach out to local people in the former Yugoslavia. Its outreach department, however, was created only in 1999 -too little too late -and it is staffed by just two people. In addition, the outreach department has never received funding from the UN, and instead has had to rely 34 It is not only victims and defendants who are unfamiliar with the common law system, however. In addition, ' defense attorneys come to the Tribunal under-equipped to represent their clients effectively given their unfamiliarity with the process of the court. Confronted with a largely foreign trial and dispute-resolution system, many attorneys proceed to litigate cases involving serious violations of international law with neither the knowledge nor the skills necessary to perform their assigned tasks adequately ' : Cook, ' Plea Bargaining at The Hague ' , 30 Yale J Int'l L (2005) This problem, moreover, has arguably been exacerbated since the adoption of the Tribunal's completion strategy. The ICTY's outreach department is now primarily focused on capacity-building work, that is to say on developing the capacity of local courts in the former Yugoslavia to prosecute war crimes. Given that transfer of cases back to national courts -pursuant to Rule 11 bis of the Tribunal's Rules of Evidence and Procedure -is a critical component of the Tribunal's completion strategy, such capacity-building work is extremely important. However, such work needs to complement, rather than Vi š egrad, Gora ž de, Srebrenica, Poto č ari, Bratunac, Kravica), central BiH (Ahmi ć i, Gornji VakufUskoplje, Mili ć i), north-western BiH (Prijedor, Kozarac, Trnopolje, Sanski Most), and western Hercegovina (Mostar, Č apljina, Stolac). Only 11 of the interviewees spoke English. The remainder of the interviews were conducted by the author in the local language (i.e. Bosnian/Croatian/Serbian). All interviews were recorded and transcribed, except in those cases where interviewees opposed this. In such instances, the author relied on hand-written notes. Most interviews lasted approximately one hour, but some were closer to two hours. supersede, fundamental outreach work with local communities in the former Yugoslavia. It cannot be over-emphasized that ' the relationship between a tribunal and the local populace is a critical dimension of its success ' . 40 While it is open to question whether the ICTY has suffi ciently heeded this point, its judges have made a positive link between guilty pleas and reconciliation. For example, in the trial of Dragan Obrenovi ć , the former chief-of-staff and deputy commander of the 1st Zvornik Infantry Brigade of the Drina Corps of the Bosnian Serb army, the Trial Chamber found that the defendant's guilty plea ' is indeed signifi cant and can contribute to fulfi lling the Tribunal's mandate of restoring peace and promoting reconciliation ' . 41 This posited linkage between guilty pleas and reconciliation can be broken down into two core subclaims, namely that guilty pleas establish the truth and that they offer a degree of closure to victims through the defendants ' acknowledgement of the crimes committed. It is submitted, however, that because guilty pleas are typically the result of plea bargains, in which the Prosecution agrees either to drop certain charges and/or to recommend a prison sentence within a particular range, the reconciliatory potential of such pleas is thus undermined. 
Truth, Reconciliation, and Charge Bargaining
The ICTY's three Trial Chambers have repeatedly claimed that when defendants enter a guilty plea this is important for ascertaining the truth, and that truth, in turn, is a fundamental element of reconciliation in the former Yugoslavia. 42 In its judgment sentencing Biljana Plav š i ć , for example, the former co-President of the Republika Srpska , the Trial Chamber emphasized ' the role of the guilty plea of the accused in establishing the truth in relation to the crimes and furthering reconciliation in the former Yugoslavia ' ; 43 and in the second judgment sentencing Dra ž en Erdemovi ć , the judges highlighted that ' [d]iscovering the truth is a cornerstone of the rule of law and a fundamental step on the way to reconciliation: for it is the truth that cleanses the ethnic and religious hatreds and begins the healing process ' . 44 The direct correlation that the ICTY makes between truth and reconciliation, however, is problematic for at least two major reasons. First, truth is a contested concept, and therefore has no 42 Some defendants have also made a link between truth and reconciliation. In the written statement appended to his guilty plea, for example, the late Milan Babi ć , the former President of the Republic of Serbian Krajina, explained, ' Your Honours, I can't say anything else but that I'm very sorry for what I did. I've appeared before this Tribunal and I've told the truth, and I believe that this will help to achieve reconciliation among the peoples in the Balkans ' : Statement of Milan Babi ć (2 Apr. 2004), Case Information Sheet, 
A Truth is a Disputed Concept
As the Erdemovi ć trial demonstrates, guilty pleas can play a signifi cant role in establishing the facts. In pleading guilty, Erdemovi ć furnished the Tribunal with valuable information about four eventshitherto unknown to the Prosecutionin Srebrenica, Vlasenica, the Branjevo farm in Pilica, and in the public building in Pilica, and thus greatly aided the Offi ce of the Prosecutor (OTP) in its investigations. Furthermore, according to Tieger and Shin, ' plea agreements can generate a contribution to the historical record of inestimable value -the indispensable perspective of the perpetrator ' .
45 Certainly, the written statements which frequently accompany defendants ' guilty pleas arguably offer some level of insight into why horrifi c crimes were committed in the former Yugoslavia during the 1990s.
In his statement, for example, Darko Mr đ a, a former member of the special Serbian police unit in the town of Prijedor in north-western Bosnia, wrote, ' In the beginning of the 1990s, things changed abruptly. Radio, television, press, everything was full of threats against Serbs and against Muslims, depending on whose media it was … Believing that we were faced with the same threat as Jasenovac in the past, I responded to the mobilisation ' . He added, ' Your Honours, I hope you will believe me. I did not commit this because I wanted to commit this or I One of the most comprehensive explanations offered by any defendant for his/ her behaviour came from Biljana Plav š i ć . In her statement, she emphasized the role of fear, ' a blinding fear that led to an obsession, especially for those of us for whom the Second World War was a living memory, that Serbs would never again allow themselves to become victims ' . She continued, ' In fact, I immersed myself in addressing the suffering of the war's innocent Serb victims … I remained secure in my belief that Serbs were not capable of such acts. In this obsession of ours never again to become victims, we had allowed ourselves to become victimisers. ' Commenting on Plav š i ć ' s statement, Tieger and Shin note that while this may not have represented a new insight in terms of the motivation for the crimes: it marked the fi rst time that a leader charged with war crimes and crimes against humanity referred to the role still played by the memories of the atrocities of the Second World War as a motivation, albeit not as a justifi cation, for the commission of the crimes in which she had been involved. . In its second judgment sentencing Erdemovi ć , the Trial Chamber accepted that the defendant had been forced to make a choice: either kill or be killed: Prosecutor v. Dra ž en Erdemovi ć , supra note 4, at para. 17. See www.un.org/icty/cases-e/factsheets/ achieve-e.htm .
The power of such memories and the obvious destructive potential of an ' unresolved past ' 49 fundamentally challenge Renan's view that ' [i]t is good for everyone to know how to forget ' . 50 Rather, what they demonstrate is that the past must be addressed and dealt with -it cannot be simply suppressed or ignored. In this sense, therefore, the ICTY has a very important and valuable role to play. By making a stand against impunity and trying those accused of some of the most heinous crimes, it is helping to establish a historical record of events which occurred in the former Yugoslavia during the 1990s.
What is problematic, however, is the Tribunal's claim that guilty pleas aid reconciliation by countering denial. In its sentencing of Miroslav Deronji ć , for example, the Trial Chamber found that ' the Accused's and others ' acknowledgement of these crimes serves two purposes: it establishes the truth and it undercuts the ability of future revisionists to distort empirically what happened ' .
51 While it is true that ' Facts once subject to dispute have now been established beyond a reasonable doubt by Judgements ' , 52 it is also true that denial remains prevalent throughout the former Yugoslavia. According to the United Nations Development Programme, for example: Forsberg, ' from the point of view of the future, the acknowledgement of the facts is often more important than the simple revealing of the past ' . That is to say that, ' [e]ven if factual truth is established, facts do not speak for themselves. In political life, it is the interpretation that the facts are given that is most important; and if the different interpretative frameworks do not converge, facts alone will not help to form a shared past ' . 57 Thus, it is short-sighted to claim that ' [t]he ICTY will contribute to interethnic reconciliation by telling the truth about the underlying causes and consequences of the Yugoslav tragedy ' . 58 The crucial point is that the truth cannot have a positive effect unless it is acknowledged . A truth which is contested will promote divisions and antagonism rather than reconciliation and healing.
B Incomplete ' Truth '
Notwithstanding the ICTY's truth-seeking function, when defendants enter a guilty plea the truth that ensues will often be only a partial truth. This is fi rst because a defendant who pleads guilty thereby foregoes his right to a full public trial, and this in turn has important implications for the comprehensiveness of the truth subsequently established. As the Trial Chamber noted in its sentencing of Momir Nikoli ć : by both parties, creates a more complete and detailed historical record than a guilty plea, which may only establish the bare factual allegations in an indictment or may be supplemented by a statement of facts and acceptance of responsibility by the accused.
59
The second reason is that guilty pleas are almost always entered following the conclusion of a plea agreement, and as part of such an agreement the Prosecution will often agree to drop certain charges against the defendant -i.e., charge bargaining. For example, as part of a plea bargain made between the Prosecution and Dragan Zelenovi ć , a former soldier in the town of Fo č a in eastern Bosnia, the Trial Chamber found the accused guilty on the seven counts of crimes against humanity contained in the plea agreement and granted the Prosecution's motion to withdraw the remaining seven counts of torture and rape (charged as violations of the laws or customs of war).
60 While charge bargaining frequently forms a part of plea agreements made between defendants and the Prosecution, it is nevertheless a highly controversial practice. Scharf, for example, maintains that ' plea-bargaining that results in the dropping of charges has the effect of editing out the full factual basis upon which a conviction rests and thus has the potential to distort the historic record generated by the Tribunal ' ; 61 and, according to Combs, while the ICTY considers one of its primary purposes to be the creation of a historical record, ' because charge bargaining virtually always distorts the factual basis upon which a conviction rests, its use would severely undermine that purpose ' . 62 Although the ICTY has countenanced the use of charge bargaining when defendants plead guilty, some judges have nevertheless voiced concerns. For example, in its judgment sentencing Dragan Nikoli ć , the former commander of the Su š ica detention camp in the municipality of Vlasenica in eastern Bosnia, the Trial Chamber acknowledged that when plea agreements are made ' the admitted facts are limited to those in the agreement, which might not always refl ect the entire factual and legal basis ' . Hence, ' [n] either the public, nor the judges themselves come closer to know the truth beyond what is accepted in the plea agreement. This might create an unfortunate gap in the public and historical record of the concrete case ' . 63 Similarly, the judges in the trial of Momir Nikoli ć acknowledged that, ' [i]n cases where factual allegations are withdrawn, the public record established by that case might be incomplete or at least open to question, as the public will not know whether the allegations were withdrawn because of insuffi cient evidence or because they were simply a " bargaining chip " in the negotiation process ' .
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As a result of a plea agreement, Momir Nikoli ć pleaded guilty to persecutions on political, religious, and racial grounds, a crime against humanity, and the fi ve remaining counts against him were withdrawn, including genocide/complicity to 62 Combs, supra note 9, at 146. while the Prosecution moved to dismiss numerous charges against Momir Nikoli ć , including genocide, it did not seek to remove any of the factual allegations underlying these crimes. Thus, the factual basis upon which the remaining charge of persecutions is based can be found to refl ect the totality of Momir Nikoli ć ' s criminal conduct.
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Even if the factual basis remained intact, however, it must be emphasized that ' the plea bargain may bury allegations and consequently erase those victims and bar the determination of the truths of their claims. The allegations themselves become no more than withdrawn charges or, worse, a bargaining chip ' . 66 More importantly, it can be argued that prosecuting a defendant for a crime against humanity does not have the same symbolic and moral signifi cance as prosecuting him for genocide. The ultimate crime against humanity, to prosecute genocide as anything less than genocide is to do a fundamental injustice to the victims and their families. It is also necessary to consider how the withdrawal of a genocide charge may be interpreted. The dropping of genocide charges against Biljana Plav š i ć , for example, who, like Momir
Ibid., at para. 51. A propos charge bargaining, in his dissenting judgment in the trial of Miroslav Deronji ć , Judge Schomburg opined that ' [t]he test should be whether individual separable parts of an offence or several violations of law committed as a result of the same offence are not particularly signifi cant for the penalty to be imposed. In those cases the prosecution may be limited to the other parts of the offence or violations of law ' : Prosecutor v. Miroslav Deronji ć , supra note 25, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Schomburg, at para. 8.
66
Henham and Drumbl, supra note 2, at 82.
Nikoli ć , pleaded guilty to persecutions on political, religious, and racial grounds, may, according to Scharf, ' be erroneously viewed in Serbia as an admission by the prosecutor that those crimes did not take place ' , 67 thus further entrenching denial of those crimes.
To conclude this section, it is argued that the ICTY'S claim that guilty pleas aid reconciliation by establishing the truth is fl awed. First, such pleas will foster reconciliation only if the truth they bring to light is acknowledged. The fact, however, that denial remains a problem in the former Yugoslavia is indicative of the contested nature of ICTY truths. Secondly, because guilty pleas routinely follow a plea bargain, in which the Prosecutor agrees to withdraw certain charges, the truth that is thus established is likely to be incomplete, leaving victims with many unanswered questions. Even if the dropping of certain charges does not affect the factual basis, any truths which involve the withdrawal of genocide charges are arguably more likely to anger than to heal affected communities.
In relation to the Tribunal's mission to assist in restoring peace and bringing reconciliation to the territory of the former Yugoslavia, guilty pleas can certainly contribute signifi cantly. Through the acknowledgement of the crimes committed and the recognition of one's own role in the suffering of others, a guilty plea may be more meaningful and signifi cant than a fi nding of guilt by a trial chamber to the victims and survivors … the Trial Chamber recognises that an admission of guilt from a person perceived as " the enemy " may serve as an opening for dialogue and reconciliation between different groups.
68
In particular, the Trial Chambers have repeatedly argued that a defendant's acceptance of responsibility can provide a degree of closure to his victims. As one illustration, in its sentencing of Dragan Obrenovi ć , the Trial Chamber remarked that, ' [a]lthough the victims of these crimes and family members of those killed were fully aware of the crimes committed before Dragan Obrenovi ć pled guilty, it cannot be doubted that the recognition of the crimes 68 Prosecutor v. Momir Nikoli ć , supra note 8, at para. 72. The Trial Chamber also emphasized this link between acknowledgement of responsibility and reconciliation in the trial of Biljana Plav š i ć . The judges were strongly infl uenced by the testimony of Dr Alex Boraine, the former deputy chairperson of South Africa's truth and reconciliation commission, ' who spoke about the acknowledgement and acceptance of responsibility for grave crimes and the impact this can have on the process of reconciliation. He explained that if accountability for such crimes is not present, then the concept of reconciliation would be a contradiction in terms ' : Prosecutor v. Biljana Plav š i ć , supra note 43, at para 75. In her written statement, Plav š i ć herself stressed that ' [t]o achieve any reconciliation or lasting peace in BiH [Bosnia and Herzegovina], serious violations of humanitarian law during the war must be acknowledged by those who bear responsibility -regardless of their ethnic group. This acknowledgement is an essential fi rst step ' : supra note 43, at para. 74.
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Prosecutor v. Dragan Obrenovi ć , supra note 41, at para. 111.
70
Ibid., at para. 112.
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In the trial of Momir Nikoli ć , for example, the Prosecution recommended a sentence of between 15 and 20 years, pursuant to Rule 62 ter (A)(ii), and the Defence submitted that Nikoli ć should not be sentenced to more than 10 years ' imprisonment. However, the Trial Chamber found that ' it cannot accept the sentences re commended by either the Defence or the Prosecution; neither sentence adequately refl ects the totality of the criminal conduct for which Momir Nikoli ć has been convicted ' : Prosecutor v. Momir Nikoli ć , supra note 8, at para. 180. It thus sentenced the accused to 27 years ' imprisonment. This was reduced on appeal to 20 years. committed against them by a former offi cer of the Republika Srpska may provide some form of closure ' . 69 The judges referred to an article written by a Bosnian Muslim man from Srebrenica, Emir Suljagi ć , about his personal response to the guilty pleas of Dragan Obrenovi ć and Momir Nikoli ć . Suljagi ć explained, ' the confessions have brought me a sense of relief I have not known since the fall of Srebrenica in 1995. They have given me the acknowledgment I have been looking for these past eight years. ' 70 The fact that these defendants acknowledged responsibility for their crimes in Srebrenica, moreover, may have contributed to the admission by the Republika Srpska , in a report released in June 2004, that units under the government's control had ' participated ' in the massacre, a fact which it had hitherto denied.
Nevertheless, it is suggested that defendants ' acceptance and acknowledgment of responsibility are not necessarily conducive to reconciliation, due to the practice of sentence bargaining. When defendants plead guilty as part of a plea agreement, they will often -though not always 71 -receive a reduced sentence. As the Trial Chamber stated in its sentencing of Stevan Todorovi ć , ' a guilty plea should, in principle, give rise to a reduction in the sentence that the accused would otherwise have received ' . 72 Thus, in the trial of Miroslav Deronji ć , for example, the Trial Chamber accepted the Prosecution's recommendation that the defendant receive a prison sentence of 10 years.
73 While the judges have given various reasons for the mitigating effect of a guilty plea -including ' the showing of remorse and repentance, the contribution to reconciliation and establishing the truth, the encouragement of other perpetrators to come forth and the fact that witnesses are relieved from having to testify in court ' 74 -a guilty plea which is rewarded with a reduced sentence is arguably more likely to hinder than to encourage reconciliation. If, as the Tribunal claims, there is no peace without justice, the reality is that shortened prison sentences have left many victims -who are central to the reconciliation processfeeling that justice has not been done.
75
In short, they ' clearly have an interest in seeing a true offender convicted, and many victims may be prepared to face the ordeal of a court appearance rather than 72 Prosecutor v. Stevan Todorovi ć , supra note 11, at para. 80. seeing the offender receive a signifi cant sentence reduction in return for a guilty plea ' . 76 In Dragan Nikoli ć ' s trial, the Trial Chamber acknowledged that, ' [n]o doubt, the attempt to achieve reconciliation can only be fostered if the punishment, as it has always to be, is proportionate to the gravity of the crime ' . Yet it went on to emphasize that ' [t]he limited contribution of the punishment to reconciliation, however, was highlighted by victims and their relatives who were heard during the sentencing hearing ' .
77
The Trial Chamber in the trial of Biljana Plav š i ć similarly maintained that ' [n] refl ect the gravity and heinousness of the crimes committed. When sentences are reduced, this inevitably ' animates concerns within victim communities as to whether the ICTY is attaining its retributive aspirations ' .
80
The ICTY has repeatedly insisted that a reduced sentence does not detract from the seriousness of the crime. For example, in its sentencing of Miroslav Bralo, a former member of the ' Jokers ' -the antiterrorist platoon of the 4th Military Police Battalion of the Croatian Defence Council (HVO) -the Trial Chamber stressed that ' [t]he acceptance of certain circumstances as mitigatory in nature does not detract from the gravity of the crime committed, nor diminish the responsibility of the convicted person or lessen the condemnation of his actions ' ; 81 and the judges in the trial of Dragan Obrenovi ć similarly underscored that ' the allocation of signifi cant weight to the mitigating circumstances in this case should not be interpreted as dismissal of the gravity of the offence for which Dragan Obrenovi ć has been convicted ' .
82
The problem, however, is that the victims and their families are unlikely to see things in this way and they cannot be expected to, particularly in the absence of adequate outreach work by the ICTY. A witness who testifi ed in the Deronji ć trial, for example, explained, ' I saw Miroslav Deronji ć plead guilty and I felt glad that he admitted his guilt. I do not, however, understand how it is possible to give him a lenient term he himself has confessed ' ; 83 and Combs notes that ' Plav š i ć ' s victims were reportedly gratifi ed by Plav š i ć ' s plea, but they decried the withdrawal of the genocide charges and condemned in harsher tones still the lenient, eleven-year sentence.
84
Truth telling is one thing, deal cutting is another, and the latter appears to have few conciliatory effects. ' 85 Through adequate outreach work, however, the ICTY could provide victims with muchneeded explanations regarding the use of plea bargains and their implications in terms of sentencing. If victims were more informed in this regard, plea bargains would perhaps be less controversial.
It must, of course, be acknowledged that ' [j]ustice, like beauty, is in the eye of the beholder and can be interpreted in a variety of ways ' . 86 Hence, not even the harshest prison sentences can be expected to satisfy everybody that justice has been done. Ibid., at 936.
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Weinstein and Stover, ' Introduction: Confl ict, Justice and Reclamation ' , in Stover and Weinstein, supra note 40, at 4. 87 It is also important to emphasize that, for victims, ' justice ' is not simply about putting war criminals on trial and sending them to prison. Rather, it also means, inter alia , ' returning stolen property, obtaining reparations and apologies, being able to live free of fear and so on ' : Stover, supra note 75, at 15.
Yet while the ICTY endeavours ' to use the guilty plea's potential to promote reconciliation as a justifi cation for rewarding it with sentencing concessions ' , perhaps the ultimate irony is that ' rewarding it with sentencing concessions undermines its potential to promote reconciliation ' . 88 To conclude this section, it should be noted that while many guilty pleas at the ICTY are accompanied by apologies and expressions of remorse, 89 the fact that most of these pleas result from plea agreements necessarily raises questions about the sincerity of these words. Are these expressions of regret and remorse genuine or simply calculated attempts to gain a reduced sentence?
90 Indeed, ' the only way to be sure that a defendant has the " right " motivation for pleading guilty is 88 Combs, supra note 9, at 151.
89
If a defendant shows no remorse, the Tribunal will attach little weight to his guilty plea. Thus, notwithstanding his entering of a guilty plea, Goran Jelisi ć was sentenced to 40 years in prison (upheld on appeal), the equivalent of a life sentence for the 31-year-old defendant : Prosecutor v. Goran Jelisi ć , Case No. IT-35-10, Sentencing Judgment (14 Dec. 1999). 90 According to Cook, ' regardless of the defendant's state of repentance, it is an indisputable fact that a primary objective of such personal statements is to persuade the court to impose a favorable sentence ' : Cook, supra note 34, at 491. In his trial at the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), for example, Jean Kambanda -the former Prime Minister of Rwanda -pleaded guilty to the charges brought against him, provided the prosecution with nearly 90 hours of recorded testimony for use in subsequent trials of senior political and military fi gures, and promised to testify for the prosecution in those trials. However, when he got nothing in return, Kambanda was outraged and immediately stopped co-operating with the prosecution. He also sought to withdraw his guilty plea and proceed to trial. He was sentenced to life imprisonment: Prosecutor v. Jean Kambanda , Case No. 97-23-S, Sentence Judgment (4 Sept. 1998 It should be noted, however, that none of the interviewees had actually read any of the statements made by those defendants who have pleaded guilty. What is more, while they often knew about the guilty plea of a defendant from their own area, the interviewees were completely uninformed about other such pleas, thus further highlighting the fl aws in the Tribunal's outreach programme.
Genuine remorse, it is argued, is demonstrated not simply through words. As Dragan Nikoli ć emphasized in his written statement, ' mere words are not enough. Acts are needed ' . 94 In his trial, he was asked by a witness whether he could provide information on the whereabouts of her two sons, whom she had last seen at the Su š ica detention camp. After consulting with his lawyers, Nikoli ć sought to 91 Combs, supra note 9, at 151. answer her question and stated, ' [e]ven earlier I expressed my desire to meet certain persons, including victims, and people like Mrs Had ž i ć in order to provide them with some of the information that I have and tell them what I know ' . 95 The Trial Chamber thus found that Nikoli ć ' s remorse was sincere and that he had clearly demonstrated ' his willingness to contribute to the peace-building process and reconciliation in the region ' . 96 Similarly, the judges in the trial of Miroslav Bralo found that he was genuinely remorseful for his actions. Bralo had attempted to surrender himself to the ICTY in 1997, despite being unaware of the existence of an indictment against him, and he had made efforts both to assist in the location of the remains of his victims and others killed in the confl ict and to aid in de-mining operations. 97 Thus, while Jørgensen maintains that ' [a]n acknowledgement of guilt is arguably more signifi cant for reconciliation than a fi nding of guilt ' , 98 it is contended that the simple acknowledgement of guilt is not enough. As the above cases suggest, guilty pleas are more likely to promote reconciliation when defendants do not simply express remorse but also demonstrate through their actions that they are genuinely sorry for what they have done, for 95 Prosecutor v. Dragan Nikoli ć , supra note 63, at 247.
96
Ibid., at 252. 
Conclusion
The ICTY has justifi ed its use of plea bargains on two main grounds -that they save the Tribunal time and resources and that they facilitate reconciliation. Both of these claims, however, raise important broader issues which merit attention. First, the Tribunal's emphasis on the practical advantages of plea bargains highlights the political constraints placed on it. To cite Cook, ' [f]orced to confront pressures from both the United Nations and the United States that threaten its continued existence, the ICTY has little choice but to adopt a plea bargaining strategy ' . 99 Thus, it is submitted that the Tribunal's use of plea bargains exposes a signifi cant gap between, on one hand, its ambitious mandate and, on the other hand, the external pressures it faces to fi nish its work in accordance with its completion strategy. This, in turn, raises fundamental questions about whether and to what extent the Tribunal's mandate -to deliver justice, to deter, and to contribute to the restoration and maintenance of peace -is in fact realistic, that is to say achievable. 100 In short, ' [n]ever before have there been such ambitious expectations for international prosecutions as for the trials underway at the 99 Cook, supra note 34, at 476 -477. 100 It can be argued that ' a primary weakness of writings on justice in the aftermath of war and political violence is the paucity of objective evidence to substantiate claims about how well criminal trials or other accountability mechanisms achieve the goals ascribed to them ' : Weinstein and Stover, supra note 86, at 4.
ICTR and ICTY ' . 101 If these expectations are too high, it will necessarily be very diffi cult to judge these tribunals fairly and to assess their work. Hence, one of the conclusions to be drawn from this article is that ' a more realistic view of what trials can accomplish in postwar societies needs to be adopted ' , 102 and this, it is suggested, underscores the importance of much-needed empirical research, discussed below.
Secondly, this article brings to the forefront one of the major debates in the trans itional justice literature, namely the relationship between retributive justice and re conciliation. 103 Judges at the ICTY have consistently argued that guilty pleas facilitate reconciliation in two key ways -by helping to establish the truth, without which a society cannot move forwards; and by providing victims with a substantial degree of closure, as a result of the defendant acknowledging responsibility for his actions. Yet since most guilty pleas result from plea agreements, involving charge bargaining and/or sentence bargaining, the reconciling potential of guilty pleas is arguably undermined. This, however, raises the much broader question of whether tribunals can realistically be expected to contrib- 109 and that they had not been suffi ciently informed about the plea agreement. Not until July 2008 did the prosecutor involved in the 108 The author was present in the courtroom when the State Court delivered its verdict. Ž eljko Mejaki ć , the commander of the Omarska detention camp in north-west BiH, was sentenced to 21 years ' imprisonment; Mom č ilo Gruban, a guard shift commander at the Omarska camp, was sentenced to 11 years ' imprisonment; and Du š ko Kne ž evi ć , who held no offi cial position at either the Keraterm or Omarska camp, was sentenced to 31 years ' imprisonment. All three men had pleaded not guilty. Some of the victims from Prijedor and Kozarac attended the verdict and they were extremely dissatisfi ed with the Court's decision, particularly with Mejaki ć ' s sentence. 109 Avdi ć , ' Protest logora š a ' , Dnevni Avaz (31 May 2008) 11.
case travel to Prijedor to speak to victims about Fu š tar's plea agreement. Thus, the third and fi nal conclusion to be drawn from this article is that if war crimes tribunals are going to use plea agreements, and if these agreements are to stand any chance of having a positive impact, one of the priorities for these courts ' outreach units should be to inform and to educate local communities -and in particular victims -about these agreements. This lesson is perhaps particularly pertinent to the ICC, as a permanent court. Learning from the ICTY's experience, it has recognized the importance of outreach work, 110 and it is to be hoped that it will also come to appreciate the crucial relationship between outreach work and plea bargains.
